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TIME: Almanac 1990
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1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso
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1990-12-01
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èëâç ï««Nation
Why the Iran Rescue Failed
Report finds flaws, such as too few choppers, but no neglect
September 1, 1980
Ever since Americans awoke last April 25 to the shock of a rescue
mission turned to ashes in the Iranian desert, they have demanded to
know more about that failed attempt: Had the Soviets found out,
forcing the President to call it off? Why were there not more
helicopters? Was the whole operation too risky?
Pentagon officials had questions too, and so they commissioned two
studies, one a classified internal report by the men who had planned
and participated in the mission, the other a no-holds-barred
assessment by an interservice team of five generals, some retired,
some active, headed by former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James
L. Holloway III. The Holloway group's 64-page report, released at
week's end, dismisses all thought that the mission was aborted for
any reason but the lack of six helicopters, the acceptable minimum,
in which to go on from Desert One, the refueling rendezvous.
Presenting his report in the Pentagon's briefing studio, Holloway
said that the plan adopted had "the best chance of success under the
circumstances, and the decision to execute it was justified." He
added: "We encountered not a shred of evidence of culpable neglect
or incompetence."
The Holloway group did, however, find several faults. The number of
helicopters was kept to eight to reduce the risk of discovery. But
the brass concluded that it would have been prudent to have used at
least ten choppers. They also criticized the selection of Navy and
marine Corps crewmen who were familiar with the RH-53 aircraft but
not with the kind of tough, assault flying they had to do.
The dust clouds that broke up the pilots' formation and forced one of
them to turn back came as a surprise. The crews might have been able
to handle the dust had they known about it, but security had kept the
pilots from meeting their weather forecasters. Strict radio silence
had kept them from learning that, despite the dust en route, the air
was clear at Desert One. Later, the pilot who had aborted said he
would have gone on had he known that.
The report also describes the scene at Desert One, even before the
crash of an RH-53 into a C-130 transport plane, as one of confusion.
The reason: lack of precise operating procedures, because there
never had been a full dress rehearsal. THe main reason for that,
again, was the planners' understandable but overdrawn concern for
security.
Secrecy also precluded any review of the mission by outside
specialists. Moreover, the final plan was never committed to paper
so that the Joint Chiefs could study it. Either or both of these
steps says the report, "would probably have contributed to a more
thoroughly tested and carefully evaluated final plan."
TIME's Pentagon correspondent Don Sider has also learned of an
additional oversight, not mentioned in the Holloway report. SIder
reports that two C-141 Medevac planes were standing by at Saudi
Arabia's Dhahran Air Base with twelve doctors on board to treat
casualties from the team that was to have assaulted the embassy and
the foreign ministry in Tehran. But no one had reckoned on the crash
at Desert One that took eight lives and left four others badly
burned. Incredibly, the Medevac planes were equipped for every
emergency but burns.
"No one action or lace of action caused the operation to fail,"
concluded Admiral Holloway. But fail it did, at the cost of those
eight lives, seven RH-53 helicopters, one C-130 transport and $25
million in expenses. Even Holloway--like most of those who first
learned of the rescue effort after it had already failed--was
heartened that, as his report said, "America had the courage to try."